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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BETTY J. MAXWELL, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
OTIS C. MAXWELL, 
Defend ant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890252-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(g), Utah Code Annota-
ted (1953, as amended) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The proceedings below involved a 
Petition by the Respondent for an Order to Show Cause why 
the Appellant should not be ordered to pay or caused to be 
paid to Respondent one-half of his gross military retirement 
pay rather than one-half of the "disposable" retired pay 
which she had been receiving. The Domestic Commissioner 
recommended that the Respondent continue to receive one-half 
of the "disposable" retired pay. Respondent objected and 
the District Judge granted Respondent's Motion for Review 
and entered an Order requiring the Appellant to initiate an 
allotment from his military retirement pay that would 
result in one-half of the gross pay being paid to the 
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Respondent and further entered in judgment against the 
Appellant for $1,419.00. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented by this case is whether the Order 
of the Third District Court requiring that the Respondent 
be paid one-half of the Appellant's gross retirement pay 
violates the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act, 10 U.S.C. Section 1408, et. seq., which provides that 
such payments may not exceed 50% of "disposable retired or 
retainer pay" as that term is defined therein. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINITIVE 
The statute pertaining to this case whose interpreta-
tion is determinative is the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. Section 1408 (a) (4) which 
reads as follows: 
"Disposable retired or retainer pay" means 
the total monthly retired or retainer pay to 
which a member is entitled (other than the re-
tired pay of a member retired for disability 
under Chapter 61 of this Title) less amounts 
which- (A) are owed by that member to the 
United States; (B) are required by law to be 
and are deducted from the retired or retain-
er pay of such member, including fines and 
forfeitures ordered by Court's Marshal, fed-
eral employment taxes, and amounts waived in 
order to receive compensation under Title 5 
or Title 38; (C) are properly withheld for 
federal, state, or local income tax purposes, 
if the withholding of such amounts is author-
ized or required by law and to the extent 
such amounts withheld are not greater than 
would be authorized if such a member claimed 
-2-
all dependents to which he was entitled; (D) 
are withheld under Section 3402 (i) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402 
(i)) if such a member presents evidence of a 
tax obligation which supports such withholding; 
(E) in the case of a member entitled to retired 
pay under Chapter 61 of this Title are equal 
to the amount of retired oav of the member under 
that chapter computed using the percentage of 
the member's disability on the date when the 
member was retired (or the date on which the 
member's name was placed on the temporary dis-
ability retired list); or (F) are deducted 
because of an election under Chapter 73 of 
this Title to provide an annuity to a spouse 
or a former spouse to whom payment of a por-
tion of such member's retired or retainer pay 
is being made pursuant to a Court Order under 
this Section." 
Title 10 Section 1408 (d) (1) reads as follows: 
"After effective service on the Secretary con-
cerned of a Court Order providing for the pay-
ment of child support or alimony or, with res-
pect to a division of property, specifically 
providing for the payment of an amount of the 
disposable retired or retainer pay from a mem-
ber to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
member, the Secretary shall make payment (sub-
ject to the limitations of this Section) from 
the disposable retired or retainer pay of the 
member to the spouse or former spouse in an 
amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of 
support and alimony set forth in the Court 
Order and, with respect to a division of prop-
erty, the amount of disposable retired or re-
tainer pay specifically provided for in the 
Court Order. In the case of a member entitled 
to receive retired or retainer pay on the date 
of the effective service of the Court Order, 
such payment shall begin not later than ninety 
(90) days after the date of effective ser-
vice. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired or retainer pay on the date of 
the effective service of the Court Order, such 
payments shall begin not later than ninety 
days after the date on which the member first 
becomes entitled to receive retired or retain-
er pay." 
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Title 10 Section 1408 (e)(1) provides as follows: 
The total amount of the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of a member payable under sub-
section (d) may not exceed 50% of such dispos-
able retired or retainer pay. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant and Respondent were divorced by Decree 
of Divorce entered on November 12, 1987 in the Third Judi-
cial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Paragraph 8 of the Decree of Divorce ordered that each of 
the parties be awarded one-half of all retirement benefits 
accrued by the Defendant through his service in the U.S. 
Army and that one-half of the gross amount of benefit be 
paid each month to the Respondent, Betty J. Maxwell. (See 
Addendum) Said Decree of Divorce was entered pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties. 
In or about March of 1988, the Appellant, Otis C. 
Maxwell, caused the amount of his military retirement pay 
payable to the Respondent to be reduced to one-half of his 
"disposable retired or retainer pay" to comply with the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 
Section 1408, et. seq. On June 28, 1988 the Respondent 
filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause which was subse-
quently heard by the Domestic Commissioner of the Third 
Judicial District Court. The Domestic Commissioner recom-
mended that the Respondent continue to receive one-half of 
the disposable retired pay. The Respondent objected on 
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September 2, 1988 and the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third 
District Judge, granted the Respondent's Motion for review 
and on March 28, 1989 entered an Order requiring the Appel-
lant to initiate an allotment from his military retirement 
pay that would result in one-half of the gross pay being 
paid to the Respondent and entering a judgment against the 
Appellant for the arrearage that had accrued between March 
of 1988 and January of 1989. 
The Appellant seeks relief in this Appeal from the 
Order of Judge Rigtrup entered on March 28, 1989 requiring 
that one-half of his gross retirement pay be paid to the 
Respondent rather than one-half of his disposable retirement 
pay. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no evidentiary hearing conducted in the 
proceedings below. The trial Court did make and enter 
Findings of Fact as part of the Order on plaintiff's Motion 
for Review of Commissioner's Recommendation on Her Order to 
Show Cause, entered on March 28, 1989. [hereafter "The 
Order"][See Addendum] 
The Court found that a stipulated divorce was entered 
into between the parties on November 12, 1987 (Paragraph 1 
of the Order) and that each party was awarded one-half of 
the defendant's gross monthly retirement benefit from the 
Army, including cost of living increases. (Paragraph 2 of 
the Order) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act grants State Courts the authority to treat only dispos-
able retired pay, not total retired pay, as marital property. 
II. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act does not provide for a waiver of it's provisions by a 
member or former member of the military. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECTION ACT 
GRANTS STATE COURTS THE AUTHORITY TO TREAT ONLY DISPOS-
ABLE RETIRED PAY, NOT TOTAL RETIRED PAY, AS MARITAL PROPERTY 
In direct response to McCarty vs. McCarty, 453 U.S. 
210 (1981), which held that federal law as it then existed 
completely preempted the application of state community 
property lot to military retirement pay, Congress enacted 
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (herein-
after "the Act1') 10 U.S.C. Section 1408, which authorizes 
state courts to treat as community or marital property 
"disposable retired or retainer pay," [Section 1408 (c)(1)], 
specifically defining such pay to exclude amounts which are 
required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or 
retainer pay of such member, including federal employment 
taxes, and amounts waived in order to receive compensation 
under Title 5 or Title 38, and amounts that are properly 
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withheld for federal, state or local income tax purposes. 
[See Section 1408 (a ) (4 ) (B) (C)]. 
Since the passage of the Act, many state courts have 
had the occasion to interpret the provisions of the Act and 
it has been generally held that the only power a state 
court has to subject military retirement pay to the terms of 
a decree of divorce, dissolution or annulment are those 
conferred by the federal statute, 10 U.S.C. Section 1408. 
Harris vs. Harris, 670 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. App. 1984). While 
there have been some questions concerning the preemptive 
nature of the Act, that issue appears to have been recently 
settled in the case of Mansel1 vs. Mansel1, 4 90 U.S. , 
104 L. Ed. 2nd 675, 109 S. Ct. , decided by the 
United States Supreme Court on May 30, 1989. In that case, 
a pre-McCarty property settlement agreement between the 
parties provided that the Appellant would pay Appellee 50% 
of his total military retirement pay, including tint; porto,? 
of such pay which he had waived in order to receive military 
disability benefits. After the Act's passage the Superior 
Court denied the Appellant's request to modify the Divorce 
Decree by removing the provision requiring him to share his 
total retirement pay with the Appellee. The State Court of 
Appeal affirmed, rejecting Appellant's contention that the 
Act precluded the lower court from treating as community 
property the military retirement pay Appellant had waived 
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to receive disability benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed the state court, holding that the Act does not 
grant state courts the power to treat, as property divisible 
upon divorce, military retirement pay waived by the retiree 
in order to receive Veteran's disability benefits. The 
Court stated that the Act's plain and precise language 
established that Section 1408 (c)(1) grants state courts 
the authority to treat only disposable retired pay, not 
total retired pay, as community property. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently had occasion to 
consider a case dealing with the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act. In Greene vs. Greene, 751 P. 2d 
827 (Utah App. 1988), the trial court had ruled that the 
award to the plaintiff of defendant's military retirement 
was property and the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of 
defendant's net rather than gross retirement pay. The 
defendant-appellant contended on appeal that the trial 
court had erred in changing the Divorce Decree to provide 
that plaintiff receive one-half of defendant's net instead 
of gross pay, claiming that the court had amended the 
Decree and could not do so without a finding of changed 
circumstances or other compelling reasons. The Utah Court 
of Appeals rejected this argument, stating: 
"The attorneys for the parties agreed during 
the trial court hearing that federal law 
prohibited plaintiff from receiving one-half 
of defendant's gross military retirement 
benefits. We find that the courts change 
in the Decree to provide that plaintiff 
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receive one-half of defendant's net retire-
ment benefits, as mandated by federal law, 
was simply correction of a mistake and was 
not an amendment or a modification of the 
Decree necessitating a finding of a substantial 
change in circumstances." At 829-830. 
Other jurisdictions considering the issue of whether 
the gross retirement pay may be divided under state commun-
ity or marital property law have likewise held that the Act 
grants state courts the authority to treat only disposable 
retired pay as community or marital property. See Rose vs. 
Rose, 483 So. 2d 181 (La. App., 2d Cir. 1986). 
In the case on appeal before this court, the Appellant, 
Otis C. Maxwell, is a former member of the military entitled 
to retirement benefits and who has also executed a waiver 
in order to receive disability benefits. It is the Appell-
ant's position that the trial judge erred as a matter of 
law, by ordering the Appellant to pay one-half of his gross 
military retirement pay to the respondent. Because the 
resolution of this case depends entirely on questions of 
law, this court need not accord any particular deference 
to the rulings of the trial judge in the proceedings below. 
See Scharf vs. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
The recent ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mansel 1 
vs. Mansel1, supra, makes it clear that the Act is preemp-
tive on this specific issue of disposable vs. gross retired 
pay and that state courts are prohibited by federal law 
from treating total retired pay as community or marital 
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property. The Order of the court entered on March 28, 1989 
was therefore contrary to law and should be reversed. 
II. 
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECTION 
ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A WAIVER OF IT'S PROVI-
SIONS BY A MEMBER OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE MILITARY 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act 
does not contain any provision allowing a member or former 
member of the military to waive, knowingly or unknowingly, 
any of the provisions of the Act. While a Decree of Divorce 
in this case (See Addendum) was entered after the effective 
date of the Act, there is no indication in the Decree that 
the Appellant knowingly or intentionally waived his rights 
under Section 1408 (e)(1) of the Act. In Greene vs. Greene, 
supra, the original stipulation entered into by the parties 
in that case also provided that the defendant was ordered 
to pay: 
"...pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 1408 of the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act, one-half of the USAF retired gross pay...11 
At 827 
As noted previously in the Greene case, the Utah Court of 
Appeals viewed the trial court's amendment of that provision 
to provide that the plaintiff receive one-half of net 
retirement benefits rather than gross retirement benefits 
as "correction of a mistake", not an amendment or modifica-
tion requiring a finding of a substantial change in circum-
stances. Similiarly, in this case, the provision in the 
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Decree of Divorce providing for payment of one-half of 
gross benefits must be viewed as a mistake since federal 
law clearly mandates that only "disposable" retired pay is 
subject to division and because there is no evidence that 
the Appellant knowingly and specifically waived his rights 
under the Act. See Morgan vs. Quail Brook Condominium 
Company, 706 P. 2d 573, 578 (Utah 1985); Kinsman vs. Kinsman, 
748 P. 2d 210 (Utah App. 1988). Unlike Greene vs. Greene, 
supra, the Act is not even mentioned in the Decree of 
Divorce in this case. (See Addendum) 
Therefore, the Decree of Divorce in this case should 
be corrected to provide that one-half of Appellant's dispos-
able retired pay, as defined by the Act, should be payable 
to the respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below committed error by ruling that Appell-
ant was required to pay one-half of his gross military 
retirement pay to the respondent. This error should be 
corrected by this Court and the judgment for the arrearage 
entered against the Appellant in the proceedings below 
should be vacated. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Respondent, Betty J. Maxwell, 
postage pre-paid, at her last known address of 1817 West 
3550 South, #4, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 this day 
of , 1989. 
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Defend 3 int. ) 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D87-2639 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
THE ABOVE captioned matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup in his courtroom on the 2nd day 
of October, 1987, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
Counsel for the plaintiff indicated to the court that both 
parties and their counsel had just appeared before the courts 
Commissioner for Domestic Matters, and had at that time, read 
into the record a stipulation dispositive of all issues, and that 
one of the provisions of said stipulation was that the default of 
the defendant could be entered and that the matter could go 
forward on an uncontested or default basis. 
Having noted that the waiting period prescribed by statute 
had passed and based on the representations of counsel for the 
plaintiff, the court did proceed to take testimony from the 
plaintiff concerning jurisdiction, grounds and other matters of 
interest to the court. 
Having noted that counsel for plaintiff has prepared this 
decree of divorce and that counsel for the defendant, Martin 
pezely, has approved the sa?&e as fairly reflecting the 
stipulation of the parties entered into before the courts 
Commissioner as referred to above, the court now adopts the 
stipulation of the parties as outlined herein and having 
previously published its findings of fact now makes the following 
order, judgment and decree. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The plaintiff is hereby awarded a decree of divorce 
from the defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore 
existing between the parties, the same to become final upon the 
signing and entry hereof. 
2. The court orders that the plaintiff be awarded the 
care, custody and control of the parties minor children, namely 
Brian, age 17 and Abigail, age 9. 
3. The court further orders that the defendant be 
awarded reasonable and liberal rights of visitation with the 
minor children of the parties. 
4. The court orders, based on the stipulation of the 
parties, and not based on the income of the defendant as of the 
time of the stipulation, that the defendant pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $300.00 per child, per month, for a total monthly 
child support obligation of $600.00 per month, the same to be 
paid in two equal installments each month, the first due on the 
2 
5th and the second due on the 2 0th of each month, commencing with 
the month of October, 1987. The court further orders that child 
support for the minor child, Brian, shall continue until his 
eighteenth birthday, or he graduates with his regular high school 
class, whichever occurs later, at which time the child support 
for the minor child, Abigail, shall increase to the amount of 
$400.00 per month. 
5. The court orders that no alimony should be awarded to 
either party, and the same is forever barred. 
6. The court orders that the plaintiff be awarded all of 
the right, title and interest of the parties and either of them, 
in those payments due under that uniform real estate contract 
used by the parties to sell a home and real estate located at 
12066 W. Temple Drive, Morrison, Jefferson County, State of 
Colorado. Further, that the plaintiff is entitled to all future 
payments on said note and obligation, free and clear of any claim 
of the defendant. 
7. The court hereby orders that each of the parties is 
awarded those items of persona] property in their possession as 
of the date of hearing in this matter as their sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claim of the other, and subject 
to any debt(s) thereon. The court specifically orders that the 
plaintiff be awarded the 1985 Chevrolet Celebrity motor vehicle, 
subject to any debt thereon. 
8. The court orders that each of the parties be awarded 
one-half of all retirement benefits accrued by the defendant 
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through his service in the U.S. Armyf be they monthly payments or 
otherwise, and that one-half of said gross amount of benefit paid 
each month, along with one-half of all other benefits be awarded 
to the plaintiff, to include all future cost of living or other 
increases which may be provided. Further, that the defendant is 
ordered to cooperate fully with the plaintiff for purposes of 
making any application as needed for the purpose of having said 
benefit sent directly to 'the plaintiff. 
9. The court orders that the defendant be awarded the 
tax deduction available for the support of the minor children for 
federal and state tax reporting purposes, so long as he is 
current in his child support obligation as described herein and 
in the amounts described herein as of December 31st of each 
calender year. 
10. The court orders that the defendant cooperate fully 
with the plaintiff for the purpose of maintaining health and 
accident insurance coverage on the plaintiff and the parties 
minor children as it is available to him as a retiree with twenty 
plus years service in the U.S. Army, including providing all 
information and signing all forms necessary to process claims. 
The court further orders that the defendant pay one-half of all 
medical, dental, orthodontic and optical expenses incurred on 
behalf of the parties minor children, which said medical 
insurance and benefits will not pay for. 
11. The court orders that each of the parties pay as 
their sole and separate debts, those debts incurred by them since 
4 
the date of their separation. 
12. The court orders that each of the parties pay their 
own costs of court and attorneys fees. 
DATED this / >^day of ^o^ober-, 1987. 
Judge7 Kenneth Rigtr^up 
, / .^TTf.oV 
Approved: / _^ , . ..irv r v 
>** ->. X / / ' CLERK / 
Martin J. Pezeiyf^ / 
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DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216 
BLAKESLEY, PALMER & McPHIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 484-7632 
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR REVIEW OF COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION ON HER ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D87-2639 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
THE MATTER of the plaintiff's order to show cause, dated in 
June, 1988, came on for hearing before the courts Honorable 
Commissioner for Domestic Matters, Sandra N. Peuler, on August 3 0th, 
1988. Subsequent to that hearing, the plaintiff rejected the 
recommendation of the Commissioner, and made a motion to this court 
for review of that recommendation. Plaintiff's motion set forth her 
position and her cause for rejection of the recommendation of the 
Commissioner. „ * , . 
Having waited the time prescribed by law> a-nd- neither-«*t&e 
plftin'Hff v<?r th^ n^nrt having r^^iv*^ n--responsive pleading £*^ m 
"the—deiesddB^ the plaintiff filed with the court a request for 
ruling on the plaintiff's motion for review of the Commissioner's 
ruling. 
Having received no request for oral argument as provided for 
in Rule 2.8 concerning dispositive motions, having reviewed its 
file, including the motion for reviewj/ and good cause appearing, the 
court now grants the plaintiff's motion and makes the following 
findings and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that a stipulated divorce was entered 
into between the parties on November 12th, 1987. 
2. The decree of divorce provided, among other things, for 
$600.00 per month to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant as 
child support. The decree provided no alimony to the plaintiff, but 
that plaintiff receive all of the interest of the parties in a 
uniform real estate contract resulting from the sale of a home in 
Jefferson County, Colorado; and, each party was awarded one-half of 
the defendant's gross monthly retirement benefit from the Army, 
including cost of living increases. 
3. The parties had been married since April 8th, 1966. 
A h 4^^ The—Greene—ease -rel4€H3^ upoR---by- the—•aefendarrt-doos ?*ot 
apply -to -the faets- of this -
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Having published its findings of fact above, the court 
therefore concludes that there is no legally sufficient basis why 
the decree of divorce in this matter should be modified. Therefore, 
the recommendation of the Commissioner should not be followed. 
Consistent with this conclusion of law, the court makes the 
following: 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
1. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant for 
the amount of $40.00 for the increase in retirement benefits for the 
months of January and February, 1988, unless said amounts have been 
paid in the intervening period. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded further judgment against the 
defendant in the amount of $1,419.00 for her one-half share of the 
tax deduction from defendant's retirement pay of $129.00 per month 
for the months of March, 1988 through January, 1989. 
3. The defendant is hereby ordered to initiate and complete 
that^- &x?GGte&&--*feGG&&a¥¥--^ the military retirement benefits 
payable to him, so as to cause orief-half of all deductions made from 
his retirement benefits/ so that none of the deductions from his 
military retirement benefits come out of the plaintiff's one-half 
share of his gross retirement benefits. Until said allotment 
becomes effective, defendant shall pay to the plaintiff directly her 
one-half of said deduction or withholdings from retirement pay 
commencing with the month of February, 1989. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded her taxable costs of court and 
attorney's fees in amounts to be determined by the court as follows: 
A. Costs in the amount of $9.50; 
B. Attorney's fees in the amount of $4 50.00. 
These costs of court and attorney's fees are supported by the 
affidavit of plaintiff's counsel submitted in connection with this 
order, and the court makes the award of these costs and fees having 
given defendant's counsel 15 days in which to object to the 
affidavit of the plaintiff concerning costs and fees, and -naming 
y*red—no ^wjecticin t h e r e t o ^ 
DATED this 2.3 ~day of February, 1989 • 
Judge Kenneth Rigjtrup^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to attorney for defendant, Martin J. Pezely, at 23 Maple 
Street, Midvale, Utah 84 047, postage prepaid, on this $& day of 
February, 1989. y"\ 
W AT ;,?,-'"/ C':St<~ .;•• 
Deborah M. Walton, Secretary 
